The Texas  Sick Chicken  Strike, 1950s by Green, George N
East Texas Historical Journal 
Volume 26 Issue 2 Article 6 
10-1988 
The Texas "Sick Chicken" Strike, 1950s 
George N. Green 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj 
 Part of the United States History Commons 
Tell us how this article helped you. 
Recommended Citation 
Green, George N. (1988) "The Texas "Sick Chicken" Strike, 1950s," East Texas Historical Journal: Vol. 26 : 
Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol26/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by SFA ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
East Texas Historical Journal by an authorized editor of SFA ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact 
cdsscholarworks@sfasu.edu. 
14 EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
---
THE TEXAS "SICK CHICKEN" STRIKE, 1950s
by George N. Green
Miss Clara Holder, an East Texas poultry worker, wrote a letter to
Patrick Gorman, Secretary-Treasurer of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
and Butcher Workman of America, in June 1953. "I was told to contact
your office to secure help in organizing a much needed plant," Miss Holder
noted. "The majority of the workers are eager to organize, if only they
had some advice from a bonafide labor union. Would you kindly inform
me if your organization can help US."I Clara Holder's brief and innocently
worded letter sparked a tortuous organizing campaign - in Centerj Texas
- that stirred racial and class tensions, triggered a national boycott, and
persuaded the union to launch a successful drive to reform the entire
American poultry industry.
Poultry was introduced into Texas by both the early Spanish and the
early Anglo-American colonists. [t remained a nondescript industry,
producing primarily for home consumption and local markets, until outlets
for commercial marketing were provided in the mid-1920s by the establish-
ment of poultry packing plants in Fort Worth, Taylor, and a few other
towns. It is perhaps worthy of passing notice that as early as 1936 poultry
processing in Texas had attracted some public attention as being highly
unsanitary. During the wartime boom of the 19405, when poultry was not
subject to meat rationing, the industry entered a new phase with the
widespread commercial production of broilers, or young fryers. The first
noteworthy production was near Gonzales in South Texas. 2
Much the same history of poultry processing had occurred in the other
Southern states, so that by the mid 1950s the broiler industry was a growth
operation throughout the South. Costs were lower in the South because
the mild climate was favorable for year-round operations and because there
was an abundance of cheap labor. In Texas the industry had spread to
Shelby and surrounding East Texas counties, a section of the state that
is distinctly part of the South. Aside from the bloody battles between the
so-called Regulators and Moderators in the 18405, Shelby County, deep
in the Piney Woods, had been noted primarily for its lumbering. During
the 19408 business leaders in the county seat of Center organized the Center
Development Foundation to attract industry. Like other small town leaders
across the South, they offered the usual inducements of land, buildings,
and/or low taxes, accompanied by a typical pool of unskilled, native, black
and white laborers who were abandoning their marginal cotton farms. The
county and the school district also granted tax concessions to several firms.
In 1953 civic leaders boasted that since World War II they had attracted
over a thousand new jobs. many of them in the poultry business. Since
the town's population was only 4,323 in 1950, the number of new jobs
was significant, although perhaps over-estimated. In 1954 Shelby County
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ranked a close second to Gonzales County in chickens sold in Texas with
8~227 ,247. 3
Like most small southern towns, those in East Texas had long
regarded unions as radical threats to God, home, and country. Timber
workers in East Texas and throughout the South had been deeply involved
in sporatic attempts to organize unions in the twentieth century, but vir-
tuallyall were crushed by such lumber barons as John Henry Kirby. Kirby
probably summarized the region's feelings in 1911 when he referred to
conservative, AFL-type unionism as "a greater menace to Christian
civilization than the anarchists, Black Hand, Molly Maguires, Mafia, Ku
Klux Klan, and Night Riders."4 Shelby County consistently supported East
Texas' long-time Congressman, Martin Dies (1932-1944, 1952-1958), the
anti-labor chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee. In
1941 Dies observed that the CIO was infested with 50,000 Communists
who were fanatical devotees of Hitler and Stalin and that ninety percent
of all strikes could be stopped if the CIO was forced to expel these alien
traitors. ~
Workers in Center's poultry processing plants were paid the minimum
wage of 75<1: an hour in 1953. Many apparently labored under highly
unsanitary conditions, ten or eleven hours a day on their feet, with no
overtime pay - in between times of no work at all. The work was more
grueling than might be imagined. One of the town~s jewelers, Bernard
Hooks, was appalled by the condition of the laborers' hands. They were -
so bruised and swollen, with fingernails often turned inside out, that Hooks
frequently had difficulty fitting them with rings. Several workers
attested that they had to become accustomed to painful fingers, swollen
hands, and lost fingernails; no one was allowed to switch to a different
job in order to rest his hands. The plants had no grievance machineries,
seniority plans, or paid holidays. 6
In the late summer of 1953 Meat Cutters' District Vice-President Sam
Twedell and other organizers were easily able to obtain the required
number of names for a union election. The National Labor Relations
Board scheduled the union representation election for September 15 at
the Denison Poultry and Egg Company and November 5 at the Eastex
Company.'
The local business community, a rather tightly knit group, was
stunned at the announcement of a union election in the city's two major
plants. Business leaders reacted to the news by launching a drive to
discourage a pro-union vote by the poultry workers. The business campaign
relied on social pressure and argumentation. A petition opposing the union
was circulated among the city's business establishments, and most signed.
At least a half dozen businessmen, notably the jeweler, Bernard Hooks,
grocery store owner Laurie Hegler, and Weldon Sanders, a Texaco service
station operator, refused to countenance the drive. For his dissent, Sanders
was accused by his peers of "working for the Union and aU the things
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that go with it" and suffered a loss in his trade. 8 Five days prior to the
election, the 182-man Center Development Foundation purchased a full
page ad in the Center Champion. Signed by the six directors of the CDF,
the open letter declared, "We believe that Center's unusual industrial
growth is partially due to the fact that Center was known as a non-union
town where there has been no labor violence or strife."9 The ad reminded
workers of the allegedly tremendous monetary sacrifices of Foundation
members in bringing industry to Shelby County. The Foundation praised
the "harmonious" relationship between management and worker and
confided that the "employers tell us that you employees have made them
the best and most loyal workers they have ever had. "10 The Foundation
concluded its attack on unionism with the plea, "Let's all work together
to make Center a better place in which to live and work rather than a
town divided and torn by strife." 11
While business leaders worked to sway the opinion of county residents
against unionism, the plant management sought to convince the poultry
workers that they neither wanted nor needed the Meat Cutters. Prior to
the NLRB election l the Denison Poultry Company presented each
employee with a two-page letter. The owners argued that they paid all
they could afford in wages, and that they already (and voluntarily) financed
an insurance program and Christmas bonuses for the workers. The
company claimed that it was competing with poultry processors all over
the nation and that unionization would cost them customers. The letter
asserted that the union had to accept whatever the company offered or
go on strike. The owners attacked the "union method of violence, strikes,
lost time and turmoil. n "You must decide l " stated the letter, "whether
the union is making false promises to get you to pay dues. You must decide
whether you want to keep strikes, violence and hard times away from your
town, your job, and your family."12 In addition, the workers received
a mimeographed statement cautioning them not to be influenced by threats
that they would lose their jobs if they refused to join the union. In
condemning the alleged union threats, however, the Company issued its
own prediction of future reprisals. "When the election is over," the state-
ment read, "we (the Company] shall retain in our payrolls all who have
rendered faithful and efficient service." J 3
The Denison Poultry employees also received a letter from a group
calling itself the" Loyal Employees Committee. l' 14 The letter closely echoed
the arguments of the Company's two letters. In the last paragraph, the
letter explained why the "loyal" employees intended to vote against the
union. "We would rather keep the goodwill and friendship of the com-
pany," the committee explained. "We would rather keep the friendship
of the people of Shelby County and everyone connected with the poultry
business here." The letter ended with a call for freedom from union in-
tervention into the "good jobs" and bright future of Denison Company
employees. IS
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Sam Twedell retaliated in kind. One of his handbills pointed out that
the six directors of the Center Development Foundation were bankers,
car agency owners, and one lumberman. "They don't do your kind of
work or live in your kind of homes or take your kind of vacations~" the
circular claimed. "Would these men and their wives work in the plant
for a lousy 75¢ per hour'? THEY ARE AFRAID THAT IF YOU GET -
HIGHER WAGES THEY WILL HAVE TO PAY HIGHER WAGES
TO THE PEOPLE WHO SLAVE FOR THEM."16
Despite social pressures, company hostility, and the pleadings of
"loyal" employees. both Denison and Eastex Poultry Company workers
selected the Amalgamated Meat Cutters to be their collective bargaining
representative. At the Denison plant, where all the workers were white,
the vote was eighty-one to fifty-five in favor of the union. The election
held later at the Eastex Plant approached landslide proportions. Eastex
workers, seventy-five or eighty percent of whom were black, cast 118 votes
for the union and nine againsL I ?
During the seven months following the election the organizers and
officers of the Meat Cutters met repeatedly with the company owners.
The labor representatives asked for union recognition, higher wages, and
working conditions on a par with those in union organized poultry plants
in other regions of the country. 18 The union even enlisted the aid of big
business. One of Armour's industrial relations directors wrote to Ray
Clymer, owner of Denison Poultry, that Armour enjoyed "extremely
harmonious relations with unions" and that the Meat Cutters were familiar
with the limitations of the poultry business. 19 But the Texas companies
never firmly committed themselves to any of the union proposals. Sam
Twedell concisely summed up the accomplishments of the first seven
months following the election. According to Twedell:
We have been meeting with the employers continously s.ince that time,
and they would make concessions and then withdraw them at the very
next conference. They would schedule meetings with us [and] then
at the last minute cancel them. 20
Union organizer Jim Gilker drew the conclusion that the owners were not
bargaining in good faith, which federal law required. He felt that the com-
panies were determined to conduct a long fight against union recognition
and wage increases. Gilker reported that Ray Clymer, "does not take the
position that he can't pay more money, but states very bluntly that he
won't. "21
By March 1954, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters had become weary
and skeptical of the negotiations with the companies. The principals on
the union side of the bargaining table began to look for a more produc-
tive course of action. All were convinced that a strike would not only be
costly, but also futile in an area that would quickly supply strikebreakers
for the unskilled jobs in the poultry plants. Secretary-Treasurer Gorman
and Vice-President Twedellleaned toward economic action. As early as
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January Twedell had written Gorman, "we [will] put the 'squeeze' on this
poultry processor in every way that we possibly can and that can be done,
not by striking, but by taking away some of their large customers."21
Negotiations were thus subordinated to the national boycott as the means
of forcing a settlement with the Denison and Eastex Poultry companies.
According to the contracts which existed between Meat Cutter locals
and their retail employers, the latter could not legally sell products which
had been placed on the unfair list of the union. After providing the required
notice to the Center poultry companies, President Earl Jimerson issued
a proclamation which declared that "Denison Poultry Company of Center,
Texas is UNFAIR to Amalgamated Meat Cutters of North America,
AFL. "H Once this formality was out of the way, letters were sent to
companies distributing Denison products requesting them to comply with
the terms of their contracts and desist from handling the products of the
firm. Food stores and AMC locals around the country began to comply
with the boycott. 24
Ray Clymer evidently anticipated problems in marketing his merchan-
dise and decided to speed up his production in order to get as far ahead
as possible should the boycott become completely effective. The normal
chain speed on the production line in the plant was between thirty-seven
and forty-two chickens per minute. By April 5 the rate had been increased
to sixty-six chickens per minute. According to Twedell. it was not unusual
for women to pass out from sheer exhaustion during the course of the
day's work. Twedell, of course, was not an impartial observer, but there
was no doubt of the workers' unrest. Without consulting any national
union official or organizer, every union member at the Denison plant
bolted off the job on the evening of April 5. Union members at Eastex
initiated a walkout and were followed by all other employees of the
company. Both plants were shut down temporarily by the wildcat strikes,
but they soon resumed operations, as the AMC feared they would, by
tapping the area's unskilled labor supply. 25
After Twedell observed first hand the conditions that had touched
off the strike. he persuaded the union to support it. He wrote Gorman
that" ... these people are 'the salt of the earth' and we must do everything
within OUf limits to see that they get a square deal. "26 Soon the threat
of violence hung over the town as pickets tangled with reckless drivers,
county deputies, state highway patrolmen, and perhaps Texas Rangers.
The Rangers were present to maintaining law and order on election day,
but the union alleged that two strikers were beaten by them. Texas Ranger
headquarters has no record of this strike. and Captain J.F. Rogers, as
one of the three Rangers who were assigned to Center for a month or so,
recalls no incidents involving Rangers. He does remember that a state
highway patrolman scuffled with a striker at the courthouse, probably
after remarks were made by both parties. Highway Patrolmen and Rangers
are sometimes confused with one another. 2 7
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The strike was also engulfed in a wave of racism. As in most East
Texas towns. the white citizens of Center were angered by the desegrega-
tion decision of the U.S. Supreme Court (on May I, 1954). Coming on
the heels of a strike by blacks, this decision stirred endemic hatreds. Thus.
while white strikers seem to have been regarded as curiosities. black
picketers were resented. Just after the Eastex strike began, Twedell claimed
that he was summoned to the county district attorney's office. There. in
the presence of the sheriff, Twedell said he was ordered to "get those god-
damn Niggers off the picket line or some 0 f them are gonna get killed." 28
TwedeJl refused. On May 20 he sent telegrams to the FBI and the FCC
concerning a broadcast on KDET radio, a strongly anti-union station,
which "openly advocated violence, as a result of Supreme Court decision
... and other racial problems, if Negro pickets were not removed from
the picket lines."29 Station manager Tom Foster explained that his an-
nouncer merely had stated that "Twedell himself was advocating trouble
by ordering Negro and white pickets to walk the picket line together.
Hancock [the announcer} said that may be common practice in Chicago
[location of the union's international headquarters], but we are not ready
for that here."3o Foster, according to one of his friends, was extremely
anti-union and simply looking for an angle of attack. Twedell began
walking the line with the black picketers. 31
On May 9 organizer Allen Williams prophetically reported that "We
are sitting on a keg of dynamite ... J honestly think our lives are in danger
... These bastards will stop at nothing, including murder, if they think
there is half a chance to _get away with it."32 On the night of July 23 a
time bomb explosion destroyed Williams' Ford. A fire which resulted as
an after-effect of the detonation completely leveled two cabins of the
tourist court where Williams was residing and did extensive damage to
two other buildings. Fortunately, Williams had stayed out later than usual
on the night of the bombing and thus escaped injury. The would-be
assassins were never apprehended and, according to his reports in the next
few weeks, Williams held some doubts that law enforcement officers
seriously sought to find them. Remarking on the openly anti-union
sentiments of a majority of the members of a grand jury investigating the
bombing, Williams jokingly explained that he felt some fear of being
indicted for the crime himself. A second bombing occurred near the black
"quarters" in Center on August 12. Though the August bombing scared
the black strikers, Williams observed that they weren't showing it openly.3J
Neither of the two banks, whose presidents were directors of the
Center Development Foundation, extended credit to their fellow townfolk
on strike. But the Meat Cutters paid regular benefits through the dura-
tion of the conflict and also conducted a highly successful nationwide
clothing drive for the strikers. So much clothing was received from the
locals that it actually became necessary for President Jimerson to request
members to halt the donations. 34
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Though the union neither expected nor won the support of Center's
business and political leadership, it did a surprisingly good job in securing
the confidence of some of the area's citizenry. Allen Williams believed
that the union had eighty-five percent of the population on its side, though
this hardly seems likely considering the historic image of unions in the
area or the racism aroused by the strike. Both Williams and Twedell
attributed a great portion of this support to the union's radio program.
Each Saturday afternoon the Meat Cutters purchased time on the local
radio station at Center, during which a union representative would explain
various facets of the union's side of the controversy. Twedell believed the ...---
program had a fruitful audience; if so, it probably included some of the
chicken growers in the area, who suspected price fixing on the part of the
feed houses and processing plants. Most of the black community, which
numbered about thirty-eight percent of the town, supported the strikers
and the programs. 3S
One of these programs early in May 1954 included an explanation
of the tax structure in Shelby County. The union revealed during the broad-
cast that the Eastex Poultry Plant, which had been valued publicly by its
owner at $500,000, was listed on county and state tax books as worth only
$5 JOOO. The combined county and state tax for 1953 had been $76. The
Denison building, according to the labor broadcast, was valued on tax
rolls at $1,160 and was taxed only $25 in 1953. These disclosures embar-
rassed the business community and aroused the populace. Twedell repeated
his charges. with 500 persons looking on, before a dramatic evening session
of the city council. Mayor O.H. Polley defended the low taxes as necessary
inducements for industry. Union leaders then held a pep rally, and the
antagonistic Champion admitted that they "were soundly cheered by a
large portion of the audience." 36 Twedell recorded that the expose" caused
quite a furor and I don't believe there has been as much excitement in
Shelby County since the Civil War. "31
The strike in Shelby County and even the Denison and Eastex boycotts
were soon overshadowed by another major thrust in the union's campaign
against the Center poultry firms. As early as February of 1954, organizer
Jim Gilker reported to Patrick Gorman:
Our ace with Denison is that they don't have Federal Poultry inspec-
tion This means that there is no doctor on the line checking the
birds At the present time the inspectors are condemning a large
number of birds because of •Air Sac disease l in the inspected plants.
At the Denison plants these birds are packed and shipped out. lB
In April 1954 Sam Twedell began forwarding affidavits depicting gory
and unsanitary conditions in the poultry plants to Secretary-Treasurer
Gorman. One Center poultry worker testified:
My job was to pull feathers ... When the chickens reached me, most
of the feathers were off the bodies and I could see the skin of the
birds very clearly. It is quite often that thousands of chickens would
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pass on the line with sores on their bodies. Thousands of them would
have large swellings as large as a chicken egg on their bodies. These
swellings were filled with a yellowish pus, and the odor was very strong.
Others would have red spots allover their bodies that looked like
smallpox. 39
An affidavit from another worker declared:
When I was killing chickens I have cut the throats of many chickens
that were already dead and stiff... The first time I saw these kind of
chickens come along, I did not cut their throats, but (my) supervisors
came and told me to cut their throats and let them go through with
the good ones... When on the killing job, I would also kill chickens
that would be sick and have long, thick and stringy pus coming from
their mouths and nostrils. When clipping gizzards I would see large
growths on the entrails that looked like a mass of jelly. These chicken
entrails would smell awfully bad, and at times would make me sick
at my stomach... 40
A lady at Eastex avowed:
...The entrails would have yellowish pimples all over them, and they
would also be covered with a thick and slimy yellow pus which had
a very offensive odor. The odor would be so bad I could hardly bear
to stay on my job. They would also be covered with stiff worms about
the size of a broom straw and from 2 to 4 inches long. The livers would
be spotted and have dark red sores on them. The boss told us to save
every liver. Sometimes the liver would be green. I have tried to throw
these livers away and the boss would stop me and say that they wanted
to keep every liver. I always put these diseased livers in with the good
ones. Il was a regular thing for bad livers to come through for an
hour at a time. When they started coming they would all be bad with
the exception of .3 or 4 out of thousands. 41
Sam Twedell dramatically reviewed the loathsome conditions in the
Texas poultry industry before the Amalgamated's executive board in the
spring of 1954. Reports by others of somewhat similar conditions elsewhere
lent strength to the arguments. Upon Pat Gorman's recommendation, the
board approved the launching of a campaign for an effective poultry
inspection program. The union enlisted the complete support of its 500
locals, as well as the endorsement of the AFL-CIO and most of the nation's
labor press. Active support came from public health officers, conserva-
tionist spokesmen, and church groups - from the national to the local
level. The drive was assisted by at least a dozen national organizations,
such as the Association of State and Territorial Health Officers, the
American Nurses Association, the General Federation of Women's Clubs,
the American Association of University Women, and the National Farmers
Union. The campaign did not receive notable coverage from the mass
media, though several journal articles appeared as well as syndicated col-
umns by Victor Riesel and Drew Pearson. 42
The Amalgamated also approached the legislative branches of the state
and federal governments. Hilton Hanna, the leading black executive in
the AMC, was responsible for most of the research and pamphleteering.
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He listed thirty-four key supporters in Congress; none were from Texas
and only three were from the South. As the campaign picked up public
support, the Southwestern Association of Poultry, Egg, and Allied
Industries suddenly endorsed state legislation for poultry inspection, but
continued to oppose "federal interference." Texas' Agricultural Commis-
sioner John White took the same position, but the state legislature could
not be roused. The most graphic union pamphlet, "Check That Chick,"
caused an Arizona state senator, known for his anti-labor stance, to lose
his breakfast and introduce a poultry inspection bill. Gorman and Twedell
believed that federal law was best, however, and that state laws would -
only conflict with each other and allow the processors, through their
political connections, to control the various inspection systems. 43
Five hearings on poultry conditions were held before three different
congressional committees in the mid-1950s. AMC spokesmen presented
some of the Center affidavits along with statistics from the U.S. Public
Health Service and Bureau of Labor Statistics. Expert supporting testimony
\\las offered by veterinarians, doctors. sanitarians, and scientists. During
the course of the hearings it was revealed that poultry and man share some
twenty-six diseases, twenty-four of which are not ordinarily carried to the
consumer who buys eviscerated fowls. The illness most likely to be
transmitted is salmonellosis, an intestinal infection marked by fever,
nausea, and vomiting. If the victim is very young or very old, this type
of food poisoning can be fatal. A third of all listed cases of food poisoning
by the mid-1950s were traced to poultry. Several of the diseases constitute
a considerable risk for the workers who slaughter. process, and handle
poultry. Psittacosis (parrot fever) is the most common ailment. The first
outbreak in Texas occurred in Giddings in 1948, and two other epidemics
struck the turkey processing workers in that town before 1954; seven died.
In May 1954. forty-eight workers in a Corsicana poultry dressing plant
were stricken. In 1956, three psittacosis epidemics broke out in Texas.
Oregon, and Virginia; 136 men and women were struck and three were
killed. 44
Since the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), it has been
illegal to ship beef, veal, pork, lamb, or other red meat products in
interstate commerce unless they have been slaughtered under sanitary
conditions and inspected by government veterinarians. Many states also
adopted compulsory meat-inspection laws. When these laws were being
passed, however, the poultry business was still small and was not induded
in the provisions. By the mid-1950s poultry was a major food, its con- ---
sumption having grown to an estimated thirty-five pounds per capita. The
government inspection service that was available until 1958 was volun-
tary and had to be paid for by the poultry processors. Only conscientious
companies willing and able to pay the costs had government inspectors
on duty, and the companies could transfer the inspectors if they did not
like their work. In some companies there was a tradition of "close
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relations" between inspector and plant. Marginal plants as well as the
unscrupulous and unsanitary companies, the ones most in need of inspec-
tion, shipped the poultry uninspected. Less than one-fourth of the poultry
marketed in the United States in the mid-1950s had been subjected to
federal inspection.4s Neither Denison nor Eastex hired inspectors, though
Eastex claimed it hired a "resident sanitarian" in the spring of 1953. 46
Eastex owner Joe Fechtel told a radio audience that the union offered
him a contract in lieu of exposing the diseased poultry he was processing,
which he denied was happening. A letter written by organizer Jim Gilker
states that the sick "birds" at Denison were the union's "ace." Pat
Gorman, after receiving the first affidavits on the diseased chickens, wrote
Sam Twedell that the Amalgamated would "blast the hell out of the poultry
industry if the Denison and Eastex strike isn't settled. "47 The union's
primary goals were to organize the workers and improve their wages and
hours. Obviously the AMC in the mid-1950s did not, and often probably
could not, require hygenic factories and unsullied poultry in its contracts.
In the midst of the boycott and national publicity, after an eleven .
month strike, the Eastex Poultry Company yielded and agreed to a contract
with the Meat Cutters. The terms of the March 1955 agreement called for
wage increases of 5¢ an hour for women t 7 Y2¢ for men; time and a half
for overtime; three paid holidays each year; the establishment of a vaca-
tion system and grievance machinery; and the reinstatement of all strikers.
If called to the plant, the workers had to be given at least three hours t
work that day. The re-employment was with full seniority. which meant
that the twenty or twenty-five' 'scabsH left in the plant had lowest seniority.
The Eastex Company also agreed to submit voluntarily to United States
Department of Agricultural poultry inspection. The union labeled the win-
ning of the Eastex strike as a major victory and called for its membership
to re-double efforts to win at the Denison plant. 48
When the expose' began to arouse attention t the manager of the
Denison plant informed the supervisor, Florence Smith. that she had been
named chicken inspector and would thereafter receive her paycheck from
the City of Center. The city government obediently notified Texas
Agricultural Commissioner John White that Miss Smith would inspect
all poultry for wholesomeness. Like all of White's "inspectors," Miss
Smith lacked the guidance of any published tests or standards because
Texas had no poultry inspection law. After several days as inspector,
Florence Smith discovered that the chickens she had condemned and
removed from the production chain had been put back on further down
the line by another supervisor. 49 She testified, moreover. that:
It has been a regular practice to place Texas Department of Agriculture
tags of approval on chickens processed in the Denison Poultry plant.
These tags of approval were placed in chickens that had never been
inspected. In fact, it has been a regular practice to place these tags on
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non-inspected chickens ever since I have been working for the company
[over three years]. 50
The struggle to unionize the Denison Plant ended in failure - three
years after the Eastex victory. In February 1958, the Meat Cutters decided
to call off the strike. Both union and company were exhausted by four years
of apparently inconclusive boycotting and striking. Ralph Sanders, an
organizer for the union, was assigned the un-enviable task of telling the
picket walkers that the strike at Center had been cancelled. "It was about
the saddest thing I was ever confronted with,n he wrote. 5l Hilton Hanna
wrote earlier that the striking Texans were the shock troops in the clean-up
campaign, that they must be supponed to the hilt, and that they "have
demonstrated a spirit that has been rare in the labor movement for many
years." Their steadfastness and zeal persuaded the Amalgamated to pay
strike benefits for four years, which not many internationals would do. 52
Ray Clymer's'unyielding position seems to have been the crucial factor
in the union's defeat at Denison. The company lost most of its markets
as a result of the boycott and eventually went bankrupt. According to
Twedell. Clymer had an independent income which he refused to plow
back into the business and preferred bankruptcy to dealing with a union.
Certainly his only offer to settle the dispute reflected contempt for collec-
tive bargaining. In June 1955 Clymer offered to recognize the union as
bargaining agent for six months and allow the strikers to return - with
no changes in wages, hours, or working conditions - if the pickets and
boycott were called off. A new election would be held in six months and
if the union won, Clymer promised to negotiate in good faith. 53
It is also possible that the workers at Eastex, ninety-four percent of
whom voted for the union in the election, seemed more determined than
the Denison strikers, sixty percent of whom originally voted to unionize.
And being largely black, the Eastex workers were more accustomed to
facing community coercion. Black workers recalled that a determined black
- union consciousness arose, even though Center's blacks had never
fought together for anything before. Moreover, there was no particular
black leadership either among the laborers or in the "quarters." The black
workers also recollected that they were more willing to walk the picket
lines thap. the whites_ 54 The blacks might have appeared to Joe Fechtel,
Ray Clymer, and other onlookers, at least during the first eleven months
of the strike, as being better prepared to withstand a long siege than the
Denison group. Perhaps Feehtel was thus partially induced to come to
terms and Clymer was thereby partially persuaded to hold out.
In evaluating the impact of the strike on the town and its establish-
ment leaders, an anonymous Chamber of Commerce spokesman declared
that it was "just about the first event from the outside world to reach
Center." There had never been a union in Shelby County; from the little
that people had read about them, they were considered alien and evil.
Moreover, companies seeking new locations at that time were notorious
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in demanding a depressed laboring group. Also, most of the townspeople
and even many of the local establishment were ex-cotton farmers who had
been driven off the land by national economic forces. They were so fiercely
independent that they seemed to innately resist even thinking about
unionism. They were particularly appalled that the chicken processing
plants were "attacked," since it was poultry that saved the town when
the bottom fell out of the cotton market in the late 194Os. Blacks and whites
walking the picket lines together at the time of the 1954 desegregation deci-
sion was deeply resented: "wetd never had any race trouble," the
anonymous leader believed. It was natural, then, that much of the com-
munity and its leaders would be hostile to an aggressive union. FinallYt
again according to the anonymous Chamber of Commerce leader, Shelby
County was "ignorant and backward and marked by a long history of
violence. ' , 5 ~
But change occurs even in Shelby County. The union, whose members
are all local, native workers, has been entrenched for over two decades
and can hardly be considered alien. The workers, who were making $4.80
per hour (with no discrepancy among the sexes) in 1984, have never been
involved in another strike. 56 Currently companies seeking new sites are
included to inquire about local services and schools and do not seem to
be searching just for low taxes for themselves. Several companies have
brought unions with them. Moreover, the processing plants are not nearly
as vital to the town's economy as in 1954. And the racial situation is
quieter; the school system is integrated. 57 Probably more townspeople now
realize what Bernard Hooks perceived in 1954, that higher payrolls mean
more prosperity for more people, more customers for the merchants.
At the time of the strike, Champion editor Bob Pinkston charged
that Sam Twedell had done more damage to the community than anyone
man ever had. The town spent six years building up consumer acceptance
of Center poultry and Twedell t he charged, had torn it down in a month.
Affidavits "from a few strikers" were used all over the nation and forced
Center to cut production, but an employee from the Agriculture Depart-
ment's Poultry Marketing Division told the editor that Center's chickens
were as fine as those anywhere. Twedell's half-truths and prejudice, he
wrote, split families, neighbors, church members, friends, and workers.
It was a pretty high price to payt Pinkston thought, for a few pay raises.
After Twedell left, he noted, the rest of the townspeople had to live with
each other in Center. Shelby County, he said, was being rapidly drained
of population in the late 1940s, but the Chamber of Commerce scrambled
for enough jobs for the town to hang on; the Chamber was not especially
proud to announce that after eighteen months of effort they had brought
a plant to Center that paid 75¢ an hour, "but it was something." Even
that sum doubled some peoplets salaries overnightt and they at least had
a minimum wage. Pinkston concluded by asking Twedell to fetch some
new, high paying industries for Center. 58
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The editor made some valid points. but even he warned the companies
at the time that they should "not make the mistake of thinking that this
[support] might be approval of your wages or working conditions by our
people." The editor seemed to know that 75<:- an hour was not a living
wage~ but still thought it ought to be tolerated. Poultry processors, he
noted in the interview, live precariously and the prices they charge retailers
are very dependent on wage scales; a price increase of 1;4 of a cent a pound
can lose a processor his customer. But the wage hands making 75¢ an hour
were existing precariously too, and most did not think that the possible
loss of a few friends was too high a price to pay for another nickel an
hour. If Shelby County could not survive without placing its labor force
in peonage, perhaps Shelby County did not deserve to survive. But, of
course, it did survive and, in fact, prosper. Pinkston pointed out in 1972
that the county was growing, the banks were "filled with money~" and
the old hatreds had "faded away. U Former strikers confirmed that bitter
feelings had disappeared. S9
The events in Center followed a dreary southern pattern. Irving Bern-
stein noted that little establishments in the small towns in the South were
among the few sectors that paralyzed the union movement in the fifteen
years after World War II. Many unions, of course~ have not been interested
in small units of unskilled workers. The wartime exemption of poultry
from meat rationing triggered a decade of growth in the southern broiler
industry, especially among independent operators. 60 The southern
independents were difficult to organize, partly because of a slow-moving
NLRB and because of Taft-Hartley provisions that permitted employers
to influence workers and to intiate representation elections. "But the
greater barrier ~" according to one historian,
was the southern pattern of employer and community resistance, small
towns, race antagonisms~ and violence - for instance, the beating
of Amalgamated representatives in Gainesville, Georgia~ in March,
1951, and the dynamiting of a tourist cabin of an Amalgamaged
organizer in Center I Texas, in 1954. The southern independents
remained a threat in 1960. 61
The outlook for the union in southern poultry brightened somewhat
in the 196Os, as the structure of the industry changed. During the 1960s
and the early 19705 the independent poultry operators largely were sup-
planted by the integrators, a few big vertical oligopolies that own
hatcheries, feed companies, processing plants and even distribution
facilities. The broiler industry became the premier agribusiness in the
South. In 1971 Dick Twedell, successor to his father as regional director
of the Amalgamated, asserted that the southern integrators were more
amenable (or vulnerable) to unionization than the independents. Though
less than a third of the thirty of so poultry plants in Texas, for instance,
were unionized, the one in Center. which had become part of the Holly
Farms chain, produced more birds than half the non-union plants put
together. 61
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The roles of the union and the federal government in the nationwide
drive for compulsory poultry inspection were duly noted by Senator James
D. Murray of Montana. In his report that followed one of the congres-
sional hearings in 1956, Murray spoke for the Committee on Labor and
'Public Welfare in praising the" ... definitive and thoroughly documented
exposeof conditions in the poultry processing industry under the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's voluntary inspection program .... )l The report
deemed the Department "seriously remiss" in never having called the
poultry conditions to the attention of the public and in never having taken
the initiative in recommending corrective measures to the president Or
Congress. The committee was shocked that the Agriculture Department
opposed compulsory inspection even though it was in command of more
facets than the union in regard to diseased poultry. The committee report
added:
While we are grateful to the union and believe the American people
will share that gratitude, we think it a shame that an organization
of workers whose earnings are very modest should have to spend its
funds to alert the Nation to a situation which is already known to
a division of a governmental department which has apparently put
its processor relationships ahead of its responsibilities to the people
of the United States. 6l
After a three-year, uphill fight the union overcame the opposition
of the poultry industry and the Department of Agriculture, which changed
its position in 1956. On August 28, 1957 President Dwight Eisenhower
signed the Poultry Products Inspection Act, which established compulsory
federal inspection of all poultry moving across state lines and in foreign
commerce. The law attempts to assure the wholesomeness of poultry and
poultry products placed on the market, the maintenance of sanitary
facilities and practices at slaughter and processing plants, and correct and
informative labeling.64 Thus, just as the "sick chickens" sold in New York
by the Schechter brothers had national implications in the 19305 - the
invalidation of the National Industrial Recovery Act - so did the diseased
poultry shipped out of Texas in the 1950s. The union organizing drive
in Center, Texas, inspired the national boycott and clean-up crusade, which
persuaded the public to ask searching questions about the quality of poultry
being consumed in the United States. The resulting legislation must surely
be judged as a permanent benefit for American consumers.
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